Stochastocracy (3):
Doing What We Do Best
by Peterson F. Whalley, dean of Grantchester College, Cambridge,
and member of the NETWork Interested In Telling-it-like-it-is
Previous instalment So, how might stochastocracy work in practice?
As to the basic selection process, there are two main options: a pooling of all eligible citizens and a random draw for a legislature of a predetermined size; or, a pooling of citizens within a riding or constituency structure. As to size, except for very small legislatures (e.g. PEI, perhaps) the pragmatic approach is to maintain the existing sizes. We will come back to this when we discuss possible transition strategies.
Having selected our representatives by some suitable random draw technique, we now face some obvious difficulties.
Competence. The first reaction of most people is "That couldn't possibly work, what if my aunt Ethel were selected? She couldn't manage a piss-up in a china shop."
Well, it turns out that neither can most of the people we elect now (nor CEOs or Deputy Ministers). Unfortunately, it's been inculcated in us that ambition creates competence. If you want something badly enough, goes the American Dream, you'll get it. But this is a minor point; we'd like to do better, not the same. Under stochastocracy we would. Why?
The basic principle is that to which we alluded in the first instalment: the trick is to create in government structures that allow native human qualities to work. Which are small-group skills. We're really good at judging each other when we know each other. We don't have to know each other that well; the levels at which we can judge others reliably corresponds to a typical tribal unit. We get fooled in mass society. To see how stochastocracy puts these abilities to work in the megasociety, let's jut walk through what would happen if aunt Ethel were selected.
Aunt Ethel's problem is that she's no rocket-scientist. Unfortunately, she doesn't really realise it, either. What happens when she and her peers have to somehow come up with a way of forming a government? In the ebb and flow of meetings that our assembly would convene and the associated lobbying poor Ethel would soon get spotted and sidelined. She'd have her seat and an office staff to annoy but that would be it.
Let's turn to Cousin Bette. She's smarter than people think but uneducated and diffident. She'd ask her best friend Valerie what to do. Valerie is a smart cookie and would help organize Bette. Bette would end up as part of the governing coalition.
We could multiply examples but we think you get the picture. We also stress that there will be very few Ethels and relatively few Bettes. The random draw will reproduce the bell burve of abilities of various sorts and where abilities are lacking everyone knows someone or knows someone who knows someone who can help out.
Relationship to the public service. Bette is now a minister. She can barely read and write. How could she lead a largely bureaucracy of professionals. She appoints Valerie as her office manager who acts as Bette's "gatekeeper" for the bureaucrats.
But what if Valerie or Bette is a psychopath, like many of the leaders liberal democracy produces?
First, this is very unlikely since the frequency of psychopaths in the general population is low. There's no active selection principle at work, lessening the odds for psychopaths getting close to power so it's very much less likely than now. Moreover, if they were, they would be gone for good at end of Bette's electoral term. It is also very unlikely that an aide like Valerie can hang on to influence as a consultant to next round of representatives.
Corruption. Why would Valerie help Bette? If she wanted more money than her salary as advisor it is possible that she could influence Bette to direct funds to her by corrupt means. However, it is very difficult for one person in a modern government bureaucracy to misappropriate money. Moreover, if Bette becomes a member of the government and gains access to more money, this is not good but this graft would at least be limited by one term. Since there are no election campaigns and no constituents to court for votes, stochastocracy would virtually eliminate advertising firm corruption, such as that recently revealed by Canadian Auditor-General Sheila Fraser, and traditional pork-barrelling.
Erosion of democratic participation. By eliminating elections would not the very basis of citizen engagement in government be eroded? On the contrary, stochastocracy could liberate new mechanisms for citizen involvement that would represent a much better use of funds than election campaigns. Citizen attention could focus on actual decisions rather than the hoopla of electoral politics. The same kind of low-level lobbying that goes on in constituency work would be moved into the arena of decision-making. Irrespective of the way the representatives choose to form a government, citizen attention would be focused on those that become the decision-makers. Possibly "consultants" would try to set themselves up as conduits to decisions but this would be far more difficult than at present, where we see a charmed circle of lobbyists who have established themselves as a de facto layer of "gatekeepers".
The internet's potential for providing more access to information, which has been subverted up to now and certainly unrealized, could be tapped. There are both tremendous amounts of information that could be made available for citizens to lobby their representatives about decisions in which they have an interest, rather the abstract, meaningless faux-policy "debate" that dominates election campaigns. The appropriate use of software to simplify and clarify decisions, especially budgetary decisions, has barely been touched.
As a further benefit, the legislatures would be improved. Legislatures have become forms of low-quality vaudeville, utterly detached from any real law-making. In the extreme, it is possible that they would replace cabinets in Westminster-style democracies and actually become the seats of "people power" that popular mythology holds them to be. At worst, they would be no worse than now and could easily become places in which serious amendments to proposed bills would at least be discussed.
Some details
Selection method. Starved rats coded with the name of every eligible citizen would be put into a pit until only the required number remains. Or the methods used for lotteries.
Size of assemblies. No smaller than 30 or larger than 2000.
Term. Four years would probably be best.
Money. To further reduce the incentives for corruption, representatives should be well-remunerated. After all they have amongst the more important jobs. Current jobs should receive complete protection at the end of their terms. Reasonable budgets for staff and expenses should be paid, including moving expenses. The current chicanery, involving seniority would end.
Forming governments. This would be left to the selected representatives, subject to the dictates of some "transition" process (see below). For example, mandated use of the internet to make information available in certain forms, a specified suite of ministries for which executives would be needed from the selected representatives, an initial method of selecting the executives (which could be a random draw), etc..
Getting there
For precisely the reasons that it lessens pork, influence peddling and psychopathy, a huge resistance to stochastocracy is to be expected.
Yet, someone just has to put it on the political agenda. This remains one of the remaining strengths of liberal representative democracy.
Here's one possible way.
If a party were to form around the advocacy of stochastocracy and to succeed in commanding the legislature, a reasonable way to proceed would be to set up a citizens' assembly by random selection to devise a transitional process. The process would cover the major topics discussed above. It is likely that the results would tend hew fairly closely to established traditions. This would then be passed into law and…off we go.
Next week, kiddies, we'll teach you how to cure all known disease.
Posted March 11, 2004
Stochastocracy (3): Doing What We Do Best © Peterson F. Whalley, 2004
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